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CAN STATE "MEDICAL" MARIJUANA STATUTES SURVIVE
THE SOVEREIGN'S FEDERAL DRUG lAWS?
A TOKE TOO FAR
M. Wesley Clark, JD, LL.M.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article explores whether, and to what extent, federal authorities can enforce the federal Controlled Substances Act [CSA] 1 against
state and local governments acting under color of a conflicting state
or local law. The question is both important and timely, inasmuch as
state and local jurisdictions have been enacting legislation in conflict
with the CSA to permit personal use amounts of drugs (particularly
marijuana) for professed pain-relief, other medical needs, and most
importantly, because of the Supreme Court's June 2005 six to three
decision in Gonzales v. Raich. 2
II.

OVERVIEW

The clear import of federal law supports the view that the CSA, as
well as implementing regulations, trump, preempt, and are "supreme"
to contrary state and local laws. 3 As an initial observation, note that
Chief Justice Marshall remarked in Gibbons v. Ogden:
[that as] to such acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but ... interfere with, or are contrary to
the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution,
... [i]n every such case, the act of Congress ... is supreme;

* Mr. Clark is a Senior Attorney with the Office of Chief Counsel, Drug
Enforcement Administration [DEA]. The views expressed herein are his
and do not reflect the views of the DEA Office of Chief Counsel, DEA, or
the Department of Justice.
1. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91513, Title II (i.e., §§ 100-709), 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). Title II of the Act is
denominated the Controlled Substances Act. Although the bulk of the CSA is
codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904, a relatively small number of its provisions
are scattered elsewhere within the U.S. Code.
2. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); see also infra note 37.
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2, provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." See also Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F.
Supp.2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001) ("Even though state law may allow for the
prescription or recommendation of medicinal marijuana within its borders,
to do so is still a violation of federal law under the CSA.").
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and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of
powers not controverted, must yield to it. 4
As one constitutional law scholar, Professor Lawrence Tribe, said,
"[u]nder the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, state action must give
way to federal legislation where a valid 'act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.'''5 That scholar
further observed that

[t]he Supreme Court typically divides preemption analysis
into three categories ... (1) "express preemption," where
Congress has in so many words declared its intention to preclude state regulation of a described sort in a given area; (2)
"implied preemption," where Congress, through the structure or objectives of its enactments, has by implication precluded a certain kind of state regulation in the area; and (3)
"conflict preemption," where Congress did not necessarily
focus on preemption of state regulation at all, but where the
particular state law conflicts directly with federal law, or otherwise stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal
statutory objectives. 6
4. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). See also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1173 (3d ed. 2000) (quoting Ogden, 22 U.S (9
Wheat.) at 211); Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 384 (1963)
('" [T] he law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not
controverted, must yield' when incompatible with federal legislation."
(quoting Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 211).
5. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1179 (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533
(1912) (dictum)). Continuing, Professor Tribe asserted: "[r]egulations
duly promulgated by a federal agency, pursuant to a valid congressional
delegation, have the same preemptive effect." Id. (paraphrasing holding
reiterated in Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).
6. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1176-77. See also English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S.
72, 78-79 (1990).
[S] tate law is pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause ... in three
circumstances. First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to
which its enactments pre-empt state law.... Second, in the absence
of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from a
"scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it," or where an Act of Congress "touch[es] a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject." ... Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it
actually conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court has found preemption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with
both state and federal requirements . .. or where state law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphases supplied).
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Observe that in instances where Congress has chosen not to, or
failed to, address preemption within a federal statute's confines, the
Supreme Court will look to "whether challenged state action . . .
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."'7 Professor Tribe adds that
a state action may be struck down as an invalid interference
with the federal design either because it is in substantive conflict with the operation of a federal regulation or program
... or because, whatever its substantive impact, it intrudes
jurisdictionally upon a field that Congress has validly reserved
for exclusively federal regulation .... 8
Other commentators have similarly concluded that "[b]eginning
with ChiefJustice Marshall's opinion in M'Culloch v. State of Maryland,9
the Supreme Court has implied a responsibility for invalidating state
laws which appear to conflict with federal law or policy."IO Two issues,
the second of which touches on the matter before us, were paramount
in M'Culloch; namely, whether the United States could establish a national bank even though the Constitution does not specifically enumerate the power to create one, and whether a branch of the national
bank located in Maryland could properly be taxed by the state. II Mter concluding that Congress could properly enact all laws which are
"necessary and proper," although not specifically enumerated, to fulfill its constitutionally assigned responsibilities, Chief Justice Marshall
next turned to the state taxation question, noting that "a power to
create implies a power to preserve" from whence it follows that "a
power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and in7. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1176 (quoting, in part, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52,67 (1941) (holding that the federal Alien Registration Act preempted a
Pennsylvania state alien registration act because the federal scheme was
comprehensive, and "the supremacy of the national power in the general
field of foreign affairs, including power over immigration, naturalization
and deportation, is made clear by the Constitution")). The Hines Court
went on to say that:
in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or
federal laws touching the same subject, [we have] made use of the
following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field;
repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency, violation;
curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or exclusive constitutional
yardstick.
Id. Further, "[i]n principle, a United States treaty or international agreement may also be said to occupy a field and preempt a subject, and supersede State law or policy even though that law or policy is not necessarily in
conflict with the international agreement .... " RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. e (1987).
8. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1177 (emphasis added).
9. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
10. 3 Chester James Antieau & William J. Rice, Modern Constitutional Law 33
(2d ed. 1997) (emphases added).
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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compatible with these powers to create and to preserve."12 The Chief
Justice also said that "where this repugnancy exists, that authority
which is supreme must control, not yield to that over which it is supreme."13 Continuing in this vein, the Chief Justice added that
no principle ... can be admissible, which would defeat the
legitimate operations of a supreme government. It is the
very essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modifY every power
vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence. 14
Maryland acknowledged that states may not "directly resist" the national bank, but argued that it was only seeking to exercise its "acknowledged powers [of taxation] upon it."15 The Chief Justice easily
disposed of this contention, commenting that whereas the citizens of
Maryland could empower their state government with the authority to
levy taxes upon that over which it had jurisdiction, only the people of
the whole United States could confer the power to tax a national
entity:
[t]he sovereignty of a State extends to every thing which exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission;
but ... it [does not] extend to those means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred
on that body by the people of the United States[.] . . .
Those powers are not given by the people of a single State.
They are given by the people of the United States, to a government whose laws, made in pursuance of the constitution,
are declared to be supreme. Consequently, the people of a
single state cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend
over them. 16
The result is that
[w] e are relieved, as we ought to be, from clashing sovereignty; from interfering powers; from repugnancy between a
right in one government to pull down, what there is an ac12. Id. at 426.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 427. Professor Tribe contends that areas of the law where it is clear
that Congress is constitutionally preeminent over the states are areas where
"Congress has complete authority to define the distribution of federal and
state regulatory power over what is conceded to be interstate commerce
. . . . suppression of sedition, debtors' rights in federal bankruptcy, and
patent and copyright regulation." TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1173-74. He concludes that "[s]o long as Congress acts within an area delegated to it, the
preemption of conflicting state or local action ... flow[s] directly from the
substantive source of whatever power Congress is exercising, coupled with
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI .... " TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1172.
15. M'Culloch, 17 u.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427-28.
16. Id. at 429.
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knowledged right in another to build up; from the incompatibility of a right in one government to destroy, what there is a
right in another to preserve. 17
Further, the Court reasoned that
[t]he attempt to use it [the state's power of taxation] on the
means employed by the government of the Union [the national bank], in pursuance of the constitution, is itself an
abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which the people of a single state cannot give. IS
[T]he states have no power ... to retard, impede, burden, or
in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional
laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers
vested in the general government. I9
III.
A.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Preemption: Conflicting, Supplemental and Occupying the Field

Normally, the first task to be addressed would be to discern the scenario with which we are faced: are state "medical" marijuana laws,
such as California's Proposition 215,20 in conflict with the CSA, do
they supplement it, or do they encroach upon a federally occupied fiel{[?
In this case, Congress has provided us with a rather straightforward
answer by apparently combining more than one category, particularly
the first and the third, and providing us with a hybrid, as section 903
of Title 21 of the United States Code provides that
[n]o provision of this subchapter [21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904]
shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the
Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates,
including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State
law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be
within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive
conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that
State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together. 21
17. Id. at 430.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 436.

20. Proposition 215 was codified as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFElY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2005).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2001). This provision was originally enacted as the Controlled Substances Act, Title II, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 708, 84 Stat. 1236
(1970). The legislative history for H.R. 18583, 91st Congo (1976), the bill
which became law, does not shed much additio~allight on section 708. See
H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 60 (1970), reprtnted m 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,
4629. The legislative history simply states that" [t] his section provides that
title II of the bill [the Controlled Substances Act] is not intended to occupy
the field (including criminal penalties) to the exclusion of any otherwise
valid State law unless there is a direct and positive conflict between the
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Put differently, where a "positive conflict" exists between the CSA and
state law such that "the two cannot consistently stand together," the
CSA "shall be construed" as evidencing Congressional intent to "occup[y] the field" in which the CSA provision operates "to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State .... "22 There can be no
more obvious example of statutes in conflict than where one statute
prohibits what the other statute affirmativelf3 professes to permit;
where two laws "cannot consistently stand together." The purpose of
section 903, it is submitted, was not to restate the constitutional doctrine of federal preemption, but to make clear that Congress did not
intend to be the sole occupant of the controlled substance field so
long as state regimes on the subject were merely concurrent24 with,
latter and a provision of this title, so that the two cannot consistently stand
together." H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, at 60, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 4566,
4629.
22. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2000).
23. As opposed to mere silence on the subject.
24. See, e.g., People v. Sheppard, 432 N'y.S.2d 467,468 (1980) ("Although the
Drug Enforcement Administration is a federal agency, concurren t jurisdiction with the State is intended under 21 U.S.C.A., section 903."); Hartford
v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 1339, 1341 (Conn. 1993) ("[T]he antipreemption provision of the Controlled Substances Act, evidences the fact that Congress
specifically considered the issue of concurrent state proceedings and decided to allow them."). Furthermore, in United States v. Lanza, the Supreme
Court considered the propriety of prohibition-related liquor charges
brought against defendants by both the United States and the state of
Washington. 260 U.S. 377, 378-79 (1922). In Lanza, there was no question
that the state of Washington and the federal government had concurrent
jurisdiction. Id. at 381. Indeed, with respect to prohibition, the Eighteenth
Amendment commanded concurrent jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XVIII, § 2. Yet, according to the Lanza Court, the existence of concurrent
power "does not enable Congress or the several states to defeat or thwart
the prohibition, but only to enforce it by appropriate means." 260 U.S. at
380 (quoting the National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 387 (1920)).
The Lanza Court continued in this vein, finding that "[e]ach may, without
interference by the other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the amendment."
Id. at 382 (emphases supplied). Moreover, in Stubblefield v. Ashcroft, which
involved an Oregon "medical" marijuana statute similar to California's Proposition 215, the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction, whereupon the
United States filed a motion to dismiss. See The Findings and Recommendations for Stubblefield v. Ashcroft, No. 03-6004-TC, available at https:/ /
ecf.ord.uscourts.gov/ (D. Or. filed Mar. 24, 2003). The Magistrate Judge
recommended that the Government's motion be granted because the Oregon statute was in "direct conflict" with the CSA and therefore, the state
statute could not stand: "[i]t [was] the state law which must give." Id. at 6,
13. Further, the Oregon law "clearly [could not] be seen as directly allowing a viable challenge to federal enforcement of the CSA." Id. at 6-7. If
the Oregon statute stayed in force, it could arguably be "seen as an attempt
to alter federal law (i.e., the CSA), it fails as a conflicting statute which is
prohibited by not only the Supremacy Clause but by the very terms of
§ 903." Id. at 8.
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and not inconsistent with, the federal scheme as enunciated by the
CSA.
It is key to keep in mind that Congress, when it was considering the
CSA, believed that the Act and already existing state controlled substance laws were "mutually supporting."25 It is submitted that to the
extent that a state law ceases to be mutually supporting, a "positive
conflict" exists and the two regimes can no longer "consistently stand
together." The intent or function of the CSA at this point, therefore,
would then be to occupy the field and trump or preempt the nonsupporting state law. 26 It would seem, then, that the CSA establishes a
standard, a threshold of control over drug-related behavior which
contemplates overlapping regulation by the States, but only to the extent that these fifty sovereigns are not more permissive. 27
25. Included within House Report 1444 were recommendations of two commissions established by successive Presidents and the actions taken in response
to those recommendations. H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 16, reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.CA.N. 4566, 4581-582. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice was established in 1966 by
President Lyndon Johnson and chaired by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. Id.,
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N at 4582. The Commission prepared a report entitled The
Challenge of a Free Society, which addressed the growing concerns of both
drug trafficking and drug abuse in the United States. 91st Cong., The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, ch. 8 (1967). The report outlined eight recommendations to help improve the drug problem facing the nation, which the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, author of House Report 1444, addressed. Id. at 216, 220-21, 223, 225, 231. "With the enactment of this bill [the CSA], virtually all of these recommendations of the
... Katzenbach Commission will have been implemented in whole or in
part through legislation, reorganization plans, or administrative action
.... " H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 16, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 4566,
4582. One of the Katzenbach Commission's recommendations was that
"[t]hose States which do not already have adequate legislation should
adopt a model State drug abuse control act similar to the Federal Drug
Abuse Control Amendments of 1965." Id. at 22, 1970 U.S.C.CAN. at 4588.
The Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee responded, noting that
"[a] Model State Drug Abuse Act has been developed and recommended to
the States. Revisions will, of course, be necessary to conform that model to
this act, since the reported bill and State laws are designed to be mutually supporting." [d. (emphasis added).
26. H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 1, 22, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 4566, 4566,
4567, 4588.
27. Compare with the federal-state electronic surveillance scheme enunciated
by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title III, 82 Stat. 197,211 (1968). States need not pass
any electronic surveillance scheme statutes, but if they do, the legal regime
constructed is allowable only if it is at least as restrictive as Title III. S. REp.
No. 90-1097, at 98 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 2122, 2187. The
legislative history of Title III provides that "[t]he State statute must meet
the minimum standards reflected as a whole in the proposed chapter [i.e.,
18 U.S.C. ch. 119 (2000)]. The proposed provision [18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2)
(2000)] envisions that States would be free to adopt more restrictive legislation, or no legislation at all, but not less restrictive legislation." S. REp. No.
90-1097, at 98, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 2112, 2187. Referring to Title
III, the Senate Report also said that "[t]he need for comprehensive, fair
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It is clear that Congress views any state drug legalization attempts to
be in conflict with and preempted by the CSA. 28 Seven years ago, almost three decades after enactment of the CSA, Congress expressed
its view in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act that:
(3) pursuant to section 401 of the Controlled Substances
Act, it is illegal to manufacture, distribute, or dispense marijuana ... ; (5) marijuana ... [has] not been approved by the
Food and Drug Administration to treat any disease or condition; (6) the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act already
prohibits the sale of any unapproved drug, including marijuana ... ; (11) Congress continues to support the existing
federal legal process for determining the safety and efficacy
of drugs and opposes efforts to circumvent this process by
legalizing marijuana ... for medicinal use without valid scientific evidence and the approval of the Food and Drug Administration .... 29
Elsewhere in the aforementioned Act, Congress again expressed its
"sense," specifically "finding:"
(5) Efforts to legalize or otherwise legitimize drug use present a message to the youth of the United States that drug
use is acceptable. . . . (7) The courts of the United States
have repeatedly found that any State law that conflicts with a
federal law or treaty is preempted by such law or treaty. (8)
The Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) strictly
regulates the use and possession of drugs. (9) The United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances30 ••• similarly regulates the use
and possession of drugs. (10) Any attempt to authorize
under State law an activity prohibited under such Treaty or

and effective reform setting uniform standards is obvious ... [gl uidance
and supervision must be given to State and federal law enforcement officers. This can only be accomplished through national legislation." S.
REP. No. 90-1097, at 69, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 2122, 2156. See also
infra pp. 32-34.
28. See Cathryn L. Blaine, Note, Supreme Court 'lust Says No" To Medical Marijuana: A Look at United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 39
Hous. L. REv. 1195, 1218-219 (2002) ("Except for use in an approved research project, § 841 of the CSA prohibits the distribution of marijuana.
The CSA does not exempt the distribution of marijuana to seriously ill persons for their personal medical use. Therefore, based on the Supremacy
Clause, the CSA preempts any State Law.").
29. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. F, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-760 through 2681-76l.
Importantly, Division F of the statute is entitled "Not Legalizing Marijuana for
Medicinal Use. " Id. at 2681-760.
30. Dec. 20, 1988, S. TREAlY Doc. No. 101-4 (1989).
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the Controlled Substances Act would conflict with that
Treaty or Act. 3l
Congress further expressed its "sense" that "the several States, and the
citizens of such States, should reject the legalization of drugs through
legislation, ballot proposition, constitutional amendment, or any
other means .... "32

B.

Constitutionality

1.

Statute Properly Founded Upon Commerce Clause 33 Power

It is black letter law that the Constitution, a document of enumerated powers, is deliberately structured so that all powers reside in the
people. 34 Certain powers, however, have been specifically bestowed
by the people upon the three branches of the federal government or
have otherwise been left to reside with the states. 35 Initial inquiry
31. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. F, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-759.
32. [d. at 2681-758. Notably, subtitle B is named Rejection of Legalization ofDrugs.
[d. Congress' continuing and clear opposition to the legalization of marijuana was again expressed as recently as 2003 in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, Div. c., Title III, § 126, 117 Stat.
107, 126 (2003), which provides:
(a) None of the funds contained in this Act may be used to enact
or carry out any law, rule, or regulation to legalize or otherwise
reduce penalties associated with the possession, use, or distribution
of any schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 802) or any tetrahydrocannabinols derivative.
(b) The Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Initiative
of 1998, also known as Initiative 59, approved by the electors of the
District of Columbia on November 3, 1998, shall not take effect.
The Resolution further imparts: "[n]one of the funds made available in this
Act may be used for any activity that promotes the legalization of any drug
or other substance included in schedule I of the schedules of controlled
substances established by section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C.812)." [d. at § 511(a). For further discussion ofInitiative 59 as well
as the legislation and litigation surrounding it, see Marijuana Policy Project
v. D.C. Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 191 F. Supp.2d 196, 199 (D.D.C. 2002),
rev'd, 46 F. App'x 633, 634, 2002 WL 31098381 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
33. "The Congress shall have Power To ... regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34. See 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 3 (1998).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
The purpose of the division of powers between the federal and
state governments pursuant to the Tenth Amendment is to protect
the liberty of individual citizens from excessive concentration of
power in a central government. By the terms of the Constitution,
certain powers are entrusted to the federal government alone,
while others are reserved to the states, and still others may be exercised by both the federal and state governments.
16A AM. JUR. 20 Constitutional Law § 222 (1998).
"The United States Constitution contains an enumeration of powers
expressly granted by the people to the federal government." [d. at § 223.
"Because the federal powers derive from such a grant from the people, it is
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must resolve whether the CSA is Constitutional; specifically, does the
act stem from one or more of the enumerated powers the people have
bestowed upon Congress?36 The answer is clear: yes. The weight of
case law in this area is overwhelming. 37 As but one example, in United
States v. Visman,38 a California marijuana grower creatively appealed
his federal controlled substance conviction claiming, in part, that
"there is no reasonable basis to assume that plants rooted in the soil
affect interstate commerce," and that "Congress does not have the authority to regulate intrastate illegal conduct that affects interstate commerce."39 The Ninth Circuit easily disposed of the appellant'S
arguments by noting that Congress, anticipating arguments such as
Visman's, set forth "findings and declarations"40 at the CSA's outset
which made it clear that there is an inextricable "nexus between mari-

36.
37.

38.
39.
40.

axiomatic that the United States is a government of limited, enumerated,
and delegated powers .... " Id. In other words, the federal Constitution is
an enabling, and not a restraining, instrument. Id. Further: "It has been
said that in the peculiar dual form of government in the United States,
each state has the right to order its own affairs and govern its own people
except so far as the federal Constitution expressly or by fair implication has
withdrawn that power." Id. at § 226.
Yet, "[wlhile the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a truism and a tautology, it is not without significance, since it expressly declares
the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion
that impairs the states' integrity or their ability to function in a federal system." Id. See also Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., 536 U.S. 424,
431 (2002) (holding that "pre-emption proscriptions" in a federal transportation statute did "not bar a state from delegating, to municipalities and
other local units, state's authority to establish safety regulations governing
motor carriers of property, including tow trucks").
"Thus, Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated power,
pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the federal
government." 16A AM. JUR. 2n at § 235.
See, e.g., Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp.2d 113, 122 (D.D.C. 2001) (denying an application for a preliminary injunction enjoining federal officials
from initiating civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings against those
involved in the medicinal use of marijuana pursuant to state laws). See also
21 U.S.C.A. § 801, 118 n.1 (2000) (Note on Constitutionality). The Supreme Court, however, did not rule directly on the matter until June 2005,
when it decided Gonzales v. Haich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). For example, in
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., the Court declared: "[nlor
are we passing today on a constitutional question, such as whether the Controlled Substances Act exceeds Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause." 532 U.S. 483, 494 n.7 (2002).
919 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1392.
These findings and declarations state, in pertinent part, that:
(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows
through interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic
which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such
as manufacture, local distribution, and possession, nonetheless
have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce
because(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in interstate commerce,

2005]

Medical Marijuana: A Toke Too Far

11

juana and interstate commerce," and following, that" 'federal control
of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic."'41 And second, by recognizing that the U.S. is party to an
international agreement mandating the regulation of controlled substances within the U.S. 42 The appellate court noted that "[ t] he Supreme Court has instructed that Congress may regulate those wholly
intrastate activities which have an effect upon interstate commerce,"
and importantly, "[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that
class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to
excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class."43 Concluding, the
court held
that Congress may constitutionally regulate intrastate criminal cultivation of marijuana plants found rooted in the soil.
[The court deferred] to Congress' findings that controlled
substances have a detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people and that intrastate drug
activity affects interstate commerce. [And] that local criminal cultivation of marijuana is within a class of commerce. 44
(B) .. .

41.
42.
43.
44.

(C) .. .
(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances.
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate
cannot be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured
and distributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in
terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured
and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured
and distributed intrastate.
(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.
(7) The United States is a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and other international conventions designed to
establish effective control over international and domestic traffic in
controlled substances.
21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
Visman, 919 F.2d at 1392 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 801 (6)).
See Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1411,
520 U.N.T.S. 204; Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
Mar. 25, 1972,26 U.S.T. 1443,976 U.N.T.S. 3.
Visman, 919 F.2d at 1392-93 (quoting, in part, Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183, 193 (1968)).
[d. (alteration to original) (citation omitted). See also Proyect v. United
States, 101 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1996) ("We therefore join the Fourth Circuit and the District of Maine in rejecting the claim that § 21 U.S.C.
841 (a) (1), by criminalizing the act of growing marijuana solely for personal
consumption, is unconstitutional [and] find that § 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(l) represents a valid exercise of the commerce power."); United States v. Correa,
No. 97-20010-01, 1999 WL 155967, at *2 (D. Kan.Jan. 14, 1999) ("Congress
can properly regulate intrastate drug activities pursuant to its powers under
the Commerce Clause."); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112 (4th
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Although the weight of authority still remains overwhelmingly supportive of the Commerce Clause as a constitutional basis for all of the
CSA,45 a Ninth Circuit panel, different from the one that decided Visman, muddied the waters when it decided United States v. Raich, determining that the "intrastate, noncommercial cultivation" and use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes, when done in conformance with
California Proposition 215 and when based upon a physician's recommendation, were outside the pale of a CSA grounded upon the Commerce Clause. 46
Consequently, the two to one 47 Ninth Circuit panel directed the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to enter a
preliminary injunction against both the Attorney General and the
Cir. 1995) ("[E]ffective control of the interstate [drug] problems requires
the regulation of both intrastate and interstate activities, [and] [t]his
Court, as well as other courts, has relied upon these findings in concluding
that Congress may regulate intrastate drug activities under the Commerce
Clause."); United States v. Smith, 920 F.Supp. 245, 247-48 (D. Me. 1996)
("[E]ven as applied to a defendant who did not engage in interstate commerce, the constitutionality of [21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(I)] does not depend
upon whether the particular defendant engaged in interstate commerce."
Further, the court believed that "section 841 [was] a constitutional use of
Congress' power to regulate commerce."); Kuromiya v. United States, 37 F.
Supp. 2d 717, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (" [T] he CSA, specifically as it pertains to
marijuana, has a connection with interstate commerce sufficient to invoke
federal power," and "[t]his conclusion would be no different even if plaintiffs could demonstrate the marijuana in individual cases did not travel
across state lines."); Stubblefield, No. 03-6004-TC at 9 (stating that the argument that the CSA exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause power "has long
been foreclosed in all federal circuits . . . . "). See generally ROBERT L.
BOGOMOLNY, MICHAEL R. SONNENREICH, & ANTHONY J. ROCCOGRANDI, A
HANDBOOK ON THE 1970 FEDERAL DRUG ACT 10, 63-4 (1975). In addition to
congressional commerce and taxing powers as constitutional bases for federal drug laws, Congress' obligation to protect national health and welfare
serves as another base. See, e.g., Narcotics Legislation: Investigation ofJuvenile
Delinquency in the Unites States, Hearings on S. 1895, S. 2590 and S. 2637 Before
the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, 91st Congo 210 (1969)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of John N. Mitchell, Att'y Gen. of the
United States). Even assuming arguendo that the Commerce Clause is not a
proper constitutional underpinning for the CSA, a treaty can also serve as a
constitutional basis for federal drugs laws, as "[a] treaty valid under the
Constitution affords a constitutional basis for an act of Congress to implement the treaty, even if Congress would not have the power to enact such a law in
the absence of the treaty." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw
§ 111 CMT. J (1987) (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 375 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 1996); Visman, 919 F.2d at 1393;
United States v. Montes-Zarate, 552 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1972).
46. 352 F.3d 1222, 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.
Ct. 2195 (2005).
47. The dissenting opinion was authored by a Senior Circuit Judge for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sitting by designation.
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DEA Administrator based upon the "unconstitutionality" of the CSA
in the context of the specific facts of the case. 48
Two California patients and associated "caregivers" [the appellants]
argued that the Commerce Clause could not properly support the
criminalization of their activities, which were purely intrastate in character. 49 They claimed the Supreme Court deliberately left this issue
undecided in its relatively recent decision, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative. 50 The Ninth Circuit specifically found that
the patients and caregivers had "demonstrated a strong likelihood of
success on their claim that, as applied to them, the CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause authority."51
Angel Raich was "diagnosed with more than ten serious medical
conditions, including an inoperable brain tumor ... " and was "using
marijuana as a medication for over five years, every two waking hours
of every day."52 Her doctor even claimed that in her condition, "foregoing marijuana treatment may be fatal."53 The second patient, Diane Monson, suffered from "a degenerative disease of the spine"
causing severe back pain and "constant, painful muscle spasms."54
Monson's doctor contended that "alternative medications have been
tried and are either ineffective or produce intolerable side effects."55
Whereas Monson grew her own marijuana, two anonymous caregivers,
John Doe Number One andJohn Doe Number Two, had been giving
Raich her marijuana for free. 56 In the Ninth Circuit's view, however,
this giving, providing, or transferring of marijuana did not constitute
the proscribed distribution or even possession with intent to distribute. 57 "Although the Doe appellants are providing marijuana to
Raich, there is no 'exchange' sufficient to make such activity commercial in character. "58 The Does, as care-giving marijuana growers,
claimed to have used only "soil, water, nutrients, growing equipment,
48. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1226, 1235.
49. Id. at 1228.
50. Id. at 1234 (citing United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532
U.S. 483, 497) (2002».
51. Id. at 1227.
52. Id. at 1225.
53. Id.
54. Id
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1228-29. In particular, the Ninth Circuit stated that the "class of activities" at issue in Raich, "the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a
physician and in accordance with state law [,] ... does not involve sale,
exchange, or distribution." Id. 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) defines "distribute" to
mean "to deliver (other than by administering or dispensing a controlled
substance) .... " "Deliver" or "delivery" means "the actual, constructive, or
attempted transfer of a controlled substance
" 21 U.S.C. § 802(8)
(2000).
58. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1230 n.3.
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supplies and lumber originating from or manufactured within California."59 DEA agents seized six of Monson's marijuana plants on August
15, 2002.60
The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction,
believing that an insufficient likelihood of success on the merits had
been established,61 but the Ninth Circuit disagreed. 62 Even though
the Ninth Circuit had previously upheld attacks upon the CSA that
had been based upon claims that the Commerce Clause was being
misapplied, none of those previous cases involved "the use, possession, or cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes. ,,63 The court
went even further, holding that the patients' and the caregivers' actions constituted a "separate and distinct class of activities. the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal
medical purposes as recommended by a patient's physician pursuant
to valid California state law."64
The court applied a four-factor test to determine that the patients'
and caregivers' activities did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce in a manner that Congress could constitutionally regulate:
(1) whether the statute regulates commerce or any sort of
economic enterprise; (2) whether the statute contains any
"express jurisdictional element that might limit its reach to a
'discrete set' of cases; (3) whether the statute or its legislative
history contains "express congressional findings" regarding
the effects of the regulated activity upon interstate commerce; and (4) whether the link between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce is
'attenuated. ,65
Examining the first factor, the court concluded that the "cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes and not
for exchange or distribution is not properly characterized as commercial or economic activity. Lacking sale, exchange or distribution, the
activity does not possess the essential elements of commerce."66
59. Jd. at 1225.
60. Jd. Notably, although the DEA was properly identified in the case caption
as the Drug Enforcement Administration, the DEA was erroneously identified in the body of the opinion as the Drug Enforcement Agency.
61. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp.2d 918, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev'd, 352 F.3d
1222, vacated, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
62. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227.
63. Jdo
640 Jdo at 12280
65. Jdo at 1229 (citing United States v. Morrison; 529 UoS. 598, 610-12 (2000)).
66. Jdo at 1229-30. Overlooked in this and subsequent cases is the fact that
there was distribution: John Does #1 and #2 gave Raich the marijuana she
consumed. Jdo at 1225. 21 U.Soc. § 802 (11) (2000) states that "distribute"
means to "deliver a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 802(8), in turn, tells
us that "deliver" or "delivery" means "the actual, constructive, or attempted
transfer of a controlled substance. 0 .. " The Raich dissent persuasively ar-
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The Ninth Circuit whisked by the second factor, noting without explanation that the "relevant portions of the CSA" contained no "such
)urisdictional hook' that would limit the reach of the statute to a discrete set of cases that substantially affect interstate commerce."67
The Ninth Circuit also breezed by the third consideration, namely
Congress' particularly expressed intent and understanding that intrastate marijuana activities are indistinguishable from those occurring
interstate such that both are subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause. 68 The court noted that such congressional findings "do
not specifically address the class of activities at issue here" because in
the facts before the court, there was no trafficking or distribution. 69
The court added that just because Congress, by virtue of the Commerce Clause, said that the CSA applied to activities that appear to be
purely intrastate in nature "does not necessarily make it SO."70
Whether the CSA "affect[s] interstate commerce sufficiently to come
under the constitutional power of the Congress to regulate" it is a
matter for the courts to ultimately determine?l
Turning to the last factor, the court found that, indeed, "the link
between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate
commerce is 'attenuated."'72 In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit held
that "[0] n the basis of our consideration of the four factors, we find
that the CSA, as applied to the appellants, is likely unconstitutional."73
It is difficult, if not impossible, to square Raich with Visman for many
of the reasons cogently set forth in Judge Beam's dissent. 74 Raich is a
stretch and even more so given that nowhere in Raich does the majority discuss any other independent constitutional bases for the CSA,
such as the treaty power of the federal government. 75 Further, the
reach of Raich is hard to know: 76 What is the difference, given the
Ninth Circuit's Commerce Clause disquisition, between the truly in-

67.
68.
69.

70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.

gued that the majority misread and misapplied Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942). Raich, 352 F.2d at 1235. But whether the activity at issue constitutes "commerce" is immaterial. Among other things, Wickard advises
that even if the activity in question is "local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress [pursuant to the Commerce Clause] if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether
such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct'
or 'indirect.'" 317 U.S. at 125.
Raich, 352 F.3d at 1231 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1233 n.7.
Id. at 1232.
Id. (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614).
Id. (quoting and citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614).
Id. at 1232-33.
Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1235-43 (Beam,]., dissenting).
See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
How many federal statutes regulating so-called "intrastate" actiVIties are
grounded upon the Commerce Clause and, based upon Raich, 352 F.3d
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trastate cultivation and use of marijuana for personal pleasure instead
of for pain alleviation? And if there is a difference, when did it fall to
courts to make an exception to plainly expressed statutory language?77
And did the Ninth Circuit really mean to suggest that transferring a
controlled substance, albeit both grown and delivered intrastate, is
also beyond the CSA?
In his dissent, Judge Beam chastised the two-judge majority for its
inability to reconcile the facts before it with Wickard. 78 Wickard, a
unanimous decision, was a case rooted in the regulatory control of the
nation's economy during the Depression. 79 Roscoe Filburn was an
Ohio dairy and wheat farmer. 8o Federal law permitted the establishment of national wheat production quotas in order to avoid wild swings in the price farmers would receive for their crops,81 and the
imposition of fines upon those exceeding their individual farms' allotment of the national quota. 82 Filburn sued the Secretary of Agriculture, and others, seeking, among other relief, a declaratory judgment
that the quota, as applied to his farm's excess wheat production, was
unconstitutional because the regime imposed pursuant to federal statute and regulation could not properly be based upon the Commerce
Clause as applied to him. 83 Filburn asserted that the excess wheat he
had grown during 1941 was intended for internal consumption on his
Ohio farm. 84 As the Supreme Court understood the federal statutory
scheme, the system of wheat production quotas and fines "extend[ed]
federal regulation to production not intended in any part for commerce

77.

78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

1222, were open to attack (at least in the Ninth Circuit) prior to Gonzales v.
Raich, 123 S.Ct. 2195 (2005)?
Chief Justice Marshall "made emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of [the federal commerce power] by warning that effective restraints
on its exercise must proceed from political rather than from judicial
processes." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 u.s. 111,120 (1942) (citing Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,197 (1824)).
"It is simply impossible to distinguish the relevant conduct surrounding the
cultivation and use of the marijuana crop at issue in this case from the
cultivation and use of the wheat crop that affected interstate commerce in
Wickard v. Filburn." Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235 (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. 111).
317 U.S. 111.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
!d. at 117.
Id. at 113-44.
Id. at 114. In particular, the Court stated:
[ih has been his practice to raise a small acreage ohvinter wheat,
sown in the Fall and harvested in the following July; to sell a portion of the crop; to feed part to poultry and livestock on the farm,
some of which is sold; to use some in making flour for home consumption; and to keep the rest for the following seeding. The intended disposition of the crop here involved has not been
expressly stated.
Id. Wickard was assessed a fine of $117.11 for his overage, yet he refused to
pay the fine. Id. at 115.
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but wholly for consumption on the farm."85 Filburn contended that
the "production and consumption of wheat" in the circumstances of
his case were "local in character, and their effects upon interstate
commerce [were] at most 'indirect."'86
Justice Jackson, writing for the Court obseIVed that "the effects of
many kinds of intrastate activity upon interstate commerce were such
as to make them a proper subject of federal regulation."87 Indeed,
the commerce power "extends to those activities intrastate which so
affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it,
as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of
a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce."88
The justices were not persuaded with the contention that Filburn's
activity was "local" and therefore could not constitute "commerce"
and determined that Congress could indeed reach such activity in appropriate circumstances. 89 The Court also thought little of Filburn's
argument that the effect of his crop upon the total market was miniscule, stating, "[t]hat appellee's own contribution to the demand for
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the
scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial."90
The Court recognized the potential that "home-consumed" wheat
might nevertheless enter the market during a period of high prices
which would then have the unwanted effect of price dampening.91
"The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function
quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon."92 The record before it, added the Court, left "no doubt that Congress may
properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where
grown if wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose .... "93 Finally,
echoing Chief Justice Marshall's comments noted earlier,94 the Court
said that "[t]he conflicts of economic interest ... are wisely left under
our system to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and
responsible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend themselves
85. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 119.
87. Id. at 122.
88. Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wright Wood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110,
III (1942)) (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 125.
90. Id. at 127-28.
91. Id. at 128-29.
92. Id. at 128.
93. Id. at 128-29.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
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to judicial determination. And with the wisdom, workability, or fairness, of the plan of regulation we have nothing to do."95
As noted above, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Raich was vacated
and remanded by the Supreme Court in a six-to-three decision inJune
2005. 96 When considering the Court's opinion, it is important to recognize that there was only a single issue before it:
The question presented in this case is whether the power
vested in Congress by Article I, § 8, of the Constitution "to
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" its authority to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States" includes the
power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana
in compliance with California law. 97
Thus, given the posture of the case in the circuit below, other bases
upon which to undermine (i.e., Ninth or Tenth Amendment infirmities)98 or support (Le., Treaty Clause power)99 the CSA -which had
been surfaced by, respectively, detractors and supporters of the federal ban on "medical" marijuana - were not presented in order to
garner the Court's evaluation. lOo "[R] espondents' challenge [was] actually quite limited."lol
Considering over a century of Commerce Clause case law, the Court
cautioned (in what perhaps could be viewed as a mild admonishment
to the Ninth Circuit) that its earlier decisions on the Commerce
Clause could not be "viewed in isolation."102 Taking that body of decisions together, the Court found that there are but "three general categories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under
its commerce power," the last of which was relevant to the instant case;
that is, Congress' "power to regulate activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce."I03
Recall that Judge Beam's vigorous dissent in Raich concluded that
the panel majority's position simply could not be squared with Wick95. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 129.
96. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
97. [d. at 2198-99. "The question before us, however, is not whether it is wise to
enforce the statute under these circumstances; rather, it is whether Congress' power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced
and consumed locally." [d. at 2201. The Court then immediately asserted:
"The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power .... " [d.
98. See infra part III.B.3.
99. See infra part III.B.2.
100. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2204-05.
101. [d. at 2204.
102. [d. at 2205.
103. [d. The other two Commerce Clause "general categories of regulation"
where Congress could properly regulate are with regard "the channels of
interstate commerce" as well as "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce." [d.
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ard.104 The Supreme Court quickly sided with judge Beam, turned to
Wickard, and noted that it and other decisions "firmly establishe[d]
Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an
economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."105 Quoting from earlier cases as far back as 1927,justice
Stevens, writing for the court, observed that" [w] hen Congress decides
that the 'total incidence' of a practice poses a threat to a national
market, it may regulate the entire class" such that "the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence."106 Continuing in this vein, justice Stevens said, restating
somewhat: "[t]hat the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment."107 This is in keeping with the Court's earlier
pronouncement that "[a]s we have done many times before, we refuse
to excise individual [e.g., purely intrastate] components of that larger
[e.g., interstate] scheme."108
According to the majority, the Wickard opinion provides "that Congress can regulate a purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial,' in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to
regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity."109 As was the case with the homeconsumed wheat in Wickard, Congress had, with respect to the CSA, a
"rational basis"110 for the statute; that is, a concern "that leaving
home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and market conditions."111
The Gonzales "medical" marijuana consumers unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish the facts of their case from Wickard by arguing,
among other things, that the farm in Wickard was engaged in a "quin104. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1235 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
III (1942)).
105. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151
(1971) and Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29).
106. Id. at 2206 (citation omitted). "Our decision in Wickard is of particular relevance." Id. (citation omitted). "The similarities between this case and Wickard are striking." Id.
107. Id. at 2209.
108. Id.
109. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2206.
110. Id. at 2208. The Court also stressed that it "need not determine whether
respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding." Id. Further:
[g]iven the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere,
21 U.S.C. § 801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit channels, we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational
basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the
CSA.
Id. at 2209 (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 2207.
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tessential economic activity;" a "commercial farm" engaged in the sale
of products grown as part and parcel of that activity.112 The "medical"
marijuana consumers thus argued that, unlike Wickard, they sold
nothing and thus did not engage in monetarily-focused or monetarilyoriented activity."113 That distinction, the Court allowed, was "factually accurate" but nonetheless does "not diminish the precedential
force of this Court's reasoning."114
Even if the agricultural activity at issue in Wickard more easily
demonstrated a "causal connection between the production for local
use and the national market," something not necessarily evident in
the case at bar, the Gonzales Court observed that it nevertheless had
before it "findings by Congress to the same effect."115
Supreme Court cases respondents cited as precedent in support of
their argument, United States v. Lopez,116 and United States v. Morrison,117 were inapposite because, with respect to the statutes at issue in
each of those decisions, there was no regulation of any economic activityYs If the focus of the laws were otherwise, such as in the case of
the CSA, the outcome would be as the Court has previously concluded: '" [w] here economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained."'1l9
As with the agricultural business regulated by statute in Wickard, the
Court concluded that activities the CSA governs are also "quintessentially economic;" in that "[t]he CSA is a statute that regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which
there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market."120
Next, the Court turned from its evisceration of the respondents'
arguments to a dissection of the positions advanced by the Ninth Circuit to support the outcome sought by the "medical" marijuana con112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2208 (referring to 21 U.S.C. §§ 801(1)-(6) (2000)).
514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Lopez Court ruled that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority and was
thus unconstitutional. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (2000).
529 U.S. 598 (2000). Morrison held that the civil remedy section of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) exceeded Congress' Commerce
Clause authority and was thus unconstitutional. Id. at 602 (The VAWA was
codified at 42 U.S.c. § 13981 (2000)). Subtitle C of Title IV enacted as the
Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, Pub. L. No. 103322, § 40301,108 Stat. 1796, 1941 (1994). Title IV was denominated the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994. § 40001, 108 Stat. at 1902. Pub. L.
No. 103-322 itself was named the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2211. See discussion of regulation of economic activity in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 and Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560).
Id. at 2211.
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sumers.121 As recited earlier, recall that the two-to-one panel in Raich
v. Ashcroft was able to dodge the sweep of the Commerce Clause by
simply declaring that the respondents' conduct did not equate to
commerce; being that, in conformance with State law, "cultivation,
possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes and not for
exchange or distribution is not properly characterized as commercial
or economic activity."122 This discrete class of activities, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, was simply beyond the pale of what the Constitution's
drafters had in mind when the Commerce Clause was crafted. 123 Taking this argument on, the Supreme Court emphasized that the issue
to be parsed was not whether federal criminalization of such conduct
was wise, but
whether Congress' contrary policy judgment, i.e., its decision
to include this narrower 'class of activities' within the larger
regulatory scheme, was constitutionally deficient. We have
no difficulty concluding that Congress acted rationally in determining that none of the characteristics making up the
purported class ... compelled an exemption from the CSA;
rather, the subdivided class of activities defined by the Court
of Appeals was an essential part of the larger regulatory
scheme. 124
The Gonzales Court stated that the fact that the nature of the conduct in which Raich and Monson were engaged was an "essential part
of the larger regulatory scheme" (i.e., the CSA), can be concluded by
first breaking down the Ninth Circuit's contentions into two parts and
then systematically refuting them. 125 First, the fact that the respondents' marijuana had been prescribed by physicians, which arguably
transmuted the marijuana into "medicine" (and thus in a class apart),
is of no moment because "[t]he CSA designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that the drug has no acceptable
medical uses."126 The Court added that the "medicinal" use of marijuana by respondents is an insufficient discriminator to justify extracting such use from the CSA's coverage, being that "[t]he mere fact
that marijuana-like virtually every other controlled substance regulated by the CSA-is used for medicinal purposes cannot possibly
121. [d.
122. 352 F.3d at 1229. By this same suspect logic, one would be forced to conclude that the "cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana" for recreational
purposes is also outside the reach of the Commerce Clause. [d. Thus, the
argument must follow, that Raich's two "caregivers" could quite properly
cultivate marijuana in any amount and provide it to her for reasons of personal enjoyment.
123. [d. at 1227-28.
124. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2211.
125. [d. at 2211-12 (citing Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229).
126. [d.
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serve to distinguish it from the core activities regulated by the
CSA."127
Second, the fact that the respondents' use of marijuana was in conformance with California law carried no weight with the majority, as it
stated: "[t]he Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides ... federal
power over commerce 'is superior to that of the States to provide for
the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,' however legitimate or
dire those necessities may be."128
Raich and Monson also argued that their circumstances were
outside the scope of the CSA's "larger regulatory scheme" because
their intrastate activity is one both "isolated" as well as "policed" by
California and thus "entirely separated from the market."129 The Supreme Court was unimpressed, commenting that "[t]he notion that
California law has surgically excised a discrete activity that is hermetically sealed off from the larger interstate marijuana market is a dubious proposition, and, more importantly, one that Congress could have
rationally rejected."130 Such a rational rejection could be based upon
the commonsense realization that exempting California "medical"
marijuana users like Raich and Monson from the CSA's reach
can only increase the supply of marijuana in the California
market. The likelihood that all such production will
promptly terminate when patients recover or will precisely
match the patients' medical needs during their convalescence seems remote; whereas the danger that excesses will
satisfy some of the admittedly enormous demand for recreational use seems obvious. 131
Such an inevitable increase of the marijuana supply in the California market would, when combined with that to be expected from the
eight or so other "medical" marijuana states, lead to the quite rational
conclusion, one which Congress could have reached, "that the aggregate impact on the national market of all the transactions exempted
from federal supervision is unquestionably substantial."132

2.

Statute Properly Founded Upon Treaty Clause Power

In addition to the Commerce Clause, the supremacy of the CSA
over state enacted amendments like Proposition 215 is supported by
the incontrovertible preeminence of the federal government in the
127. Id. at 2212.
128. Id. (quoting, in part, Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) (quoting
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 426 (1925)).
129. Id. at 2213 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Ashcroft v. Raich,
352 F.3d 1222 (No. 03-1454)).
130. Id. at 2213.
131. Id. at 2214.
132. Id. at 2215.
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field of international relations. I33 The President makes treaties which
subsequently enter into force upon the consent of two-thirds of the
Senate. 134 Once consented to, treaties are unquestionably the "supreme law of the land" and trump any contrary state statutes. 135 As
noted earlier, "[t]he U.S. is a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961"136 which, by a number of accounts, mandates the
enactment and implementation of U.S. domestic legislation. 137 In
fact, Congress made note of the treaty in its findings and declarations
with respect to the CSA,138 but interestingly the Single Convention
does not regulate marijuana uniformly in all instances. 139 "The Single
133. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17
(1936).
134. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
135. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
136. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (7) (2000). Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30,
1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204.
137. See, e.g.,John C. Lawn, The Issue of Legalizing Illicit Drugs, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv.
703,709 & n.43 (1990). Mr. Lawn was the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator from 1985-1990.
If the United States created a legal market in ... marijuana ... it
would also violate international treaties [including the Single Convention] to which the United States is a signatory... [and] [u]nder
these treaties, the United States is obligated to establish and maintain effective controls on those substances covered by the treaties .... In order to fulfill the United States' obligations under the
Single Convention Treaty, domestic legislation must be enacted
and implemented.
Id. See also United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1515 (S.D. Fla.
1990) ("[T]he United States has an affirmative duty to enact and enforce
legislation to curb illicit drug trafficking under the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs.") (citation omitted).
138. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (7). See also 21 U.S.c. § 811 (d) (2000). "The bill also specifically recognizes our international obligations under the Single Convention
of 1961 and will allow the United States to immediately control under the
schedules of the bill drugs hereafter included under schedules of the Single Convention upon the recommendation of the World Heath Organization." H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 6 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN.
4566,4572.
139. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1408, 520
U.N.T.S.204. Specifically, the convention does not require that the parties
enact domestic legislation to restrict marijuana in every case. THE SECRETARY GENERAL, COMMENTARY ON THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC
DRUGS, 1961 at 276, U.N. Sales No. E.73.x1.l (1973) [hereinafter COMMENTARY]. This is because the degree of control within the treaty scheme varies
depending upon the portion of the cannabis plant involved. Id. at 276,
312-13. Indeed, the Convention does not even use the word "marijuana."
The treaty defines cannabis as "the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant (excluding the seeds and leaves when not accompanied by the
tops) from which the resin has not been extracted, by whatever name they
may be designated." Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 42, at
1409. Thus, "[t]he leaves of the cannabis plant, when not accompanied by
the tops of the plant, are not 'cannabis,' and being listed neither in Schedule I nor in Schedule II are not 'drugs' in the sense of the Single Convention." COMMENTARY at 315. Article 28 of the Single Convention provides
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Convention is not self-executing, but works through the constitutional
and legal systems of its signatory nations."140 Inasmuch as the Single
Convention was not a self-executing treaty, domestic legislation was
that "[i]f a Party permits the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis or cannabis resin, it shall apply thereto the system of
controls as provided in article 23 respecting the control of the opium
poppy." Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 42, 18 U.S.T. at
1421,520 U.N.T.S. at 240 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Single Convention does not apply to cannabis cultivation that is "exclusively for industrial purposes (fibre and seed) or horticultural purposes." Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 39, 18 U.S.T. at 1421, 520
U.N.T.S. at 240. The third paragraph in Article 28 states that "[t]he Parties
shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent the misuse of,
and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the cannabis plant." Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, supra note 39, 18 U.S.T. at 1421, 520 U.N.T.S. at 206 (emphasis added). This would suggest that the convention parties contemplated the legal traffic and proper use of cannabis leaves. "Parties are not
bound to prohibit the consumption of the leaves for non-medical purposes,
but only to take the necessary measures to prevent their misuse." COMMENTARY at 316. "The convention does not specify any mandatory controls the
parties must adopt as to the leaves." Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
" [T] he descheduling of those marih uana mixtures containing only leaves
(no flowers or resins) would be actions consistent with our international
obligations." Petition to decontrol marihuana; Interpretation of Section
201 of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, Op. Off. Legal Counsell, 14
(1972) .
Article 22, which is a "[s]pecial provision applicable to cultivation,"
leaves the issue of control over the cultivation of marijuana to the unfettered judgment of each treaty party: "[ w] henever the prevailing conditions
in the country ... render the prohibition of the cultivation of ... the
cannabis plant the most suitable measure, in its opinion, for protecting the
public health and welfare and preventing the diversion of drugs into the
illicit traffic, the Party concerned shall prohibit cultivation." Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 39, 18 U.S.T. at 1419, 520 D.N.T.S. at
232. "[T]he authors of article 22 did not consider that any diversion
whatever constitutes ipso facto a problem of public health and welfare, but
only one which is sufficiently large to present such a problem. A Party is
therefore not bound to prohibit cultivation if the drug in question is diverted only in relatively minor quantities." COMMENTARY at 275.
But what is marijuana? Marijuana is a "mixture of leaves, stems, and
flowering tops of the Indian hemp plant," Cannabis sativa, smoked or eaten
for hallucinogenic and pleasure-giving effects. GROLIER INC., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, 317-18 (1998).
The psychoactive ingredient of marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC), is concentrated in the flowering tops. [d. at 317. Marijuana is defined in the CSA as "all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether grow-ing or not. ... Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant,
or fiber produced from such stalks. 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2000). The DEA
has changed its definition of THC; no longer does the definition only consist of the naturally occurring variety restricted as emanating from (arguably) only the "plant Cannabis sativa L." but is now said to derive from plants
"of the genus Cannabis (cannabis plant) ," as well as "synthetic equivalents of
the substance contained in the cannabis plant." 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (d) (30)
(2005).
140. United States v. Feld, 514 F. Supp. 283, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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necessary so that the U.S. could satisfy its international legal obligations manifested by and in the treaty. 141 For example, it is clear that
21 U.S.C. §§ 841,952 and 955 are among the penal provisions that the
United States has adopted to effectuate its treaty obligations under
the Single Convention."142 Of necessity, Congress had the Single
Convention in mind as a foundational underpinning for the CSA:
"The bill [H.R. 18583, ie., the CSA] also specifically recognizes our
international obligations under the Single Convention of 1961 and
will allow the United States to immediately control, under the schedules of the bill drugs hereafter included under schedules of the Single
Convention upon the recommendation of the World Health
Organization."143
Furthermore, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) concluded in a 1972 opinion written to DEA's predecessor
agency that "full compliance with our obligations under the Single
Convention could not be achieved unless marihuana is listed under
Schedule I or Schedule II of the [CSA] ."144
The command of the "drug" treaty following the 1961 Single Convention was clearer with regard to the parties' prohibition of psychotropic substances. Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the "physiologically
active chemical ... from hemp plant resin that is the chief intoxicant
in marijuana"145 is in Schedule I of the Convention on Psychotropic
Substances. 146 With respect to Schedule I substances, the treaty parties are to "prohibit all use except for scientific and very limited medical purposes by duly authorized persons, in medical or scientific
141. "If an international agreement or one of its provisions is non-self-executing,
the United States is under an international obligation to adjust its laws and
institutions as may be necessary to give effect to the agreement." Restatement (third) of foreign relations law of the united states § 111 cmt. h
(1987).
142. Feld, 514 F. Supp. at 288 (citing United States v. LaFroscia, 354 F. Supp.
1338, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) and United States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468
F.2d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1972». In La J?roscia, the court stated that,
there is an alternative ground [to Congress's constitutional authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations] for upholding the
constitutionality of the [Controlled Substances] Act. The United
States is a party to the Single Convention ... which binds all signatories to control persons and enterprises engaged in the manufacture, trade and distribution of specified drugs. Marihuana is so
specified . . . . It is clear that these provisions [e.g., 21 U.S.c.
§ 811 (d)] justify the placement of marihuana in Schedule I [of the
CSA] because of the United States' treaty obligations.
La Froscia, 354 F. Supp. at 1341.
143. H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 6, 28 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 4566,
4572.
144. Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 138.
145. 68 Fed. Reg. 14,114 n.l (Mar. 21, 2003) (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1999».
146. Feb. 21, 1971,32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 328. The treaty entered into
force in the U.S. on July 15, 1980, a decade after passage of the CSA.
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establishments which are directly under the control of their Governments or specifically approved by them .... "147
Not only is the federal government obligated under this international drug treaty regime, but the individual states are as wel1. 148 "As
law of the United States, international law is also the law of every State,
is a basis for the exercise of judicial authority by State courts, and is
cognizable in cases in State courts, in the same way as other United
States law."149
The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), "the independent and quasi-judicial monitoring body for the implementation of
the United Nations international drug control conventions ... established in 1968 in accordance with the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, 1961,"150 underscored its understanding that the United States
would continue to make sure that state laws would not be inconsistent
with the cannabis circumscriptions contained in the three major international drug conventions in its 2002 annual report. 151 In this report,
"[t]he Board notes that, in several states in the United States, discussions on liberalizing or legalizing cannabis continue," and that "[t]he
Board appreciates that the Government continues to ensure that nationallaws in line with the international drug control treaties are enforced in all states."152 This suggests that, at least from the INCB's
perspective, the United States would fall out of compliance with the
international drug conventions should the individual states enact marijuana legislation inconsistent with the manner in which the drug is
treated in the CSA.

3.

Ninth and Tenth Amendments

Another argument favored in unsuccessful assaults upon the CSA
stems not from the contention that it is an invalid legislative attempt
to implement Commerce Clause powers,153 but rather, that it is an
147. Id., 32 U.S.T. at 553, 1019 U.N.T.S. at 182-93.
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RElATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ III cmt. d (1986).
149. Id. Note that should a state supreme court have occasion to rule on the
validity of a state statute in the face of a treaty with contrary, "repugnant"
provisions, the case would be reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court, on
writ of certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
150. Mandate and Functions, http://www.incb.org/incb/mandate.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
151. Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Operation of
the international drug control system at 11, http://www.incb.org/incb/
en/ annual_reporC2002.html (2002). See also Report of the International
Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Analysis of the world situation at 44
n.302, http://www.incb.org/incb/ en/annuaIJeporc2002.html (2002).
152. Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Analysis of
the world situation at 44 n.302, http://www.incb.org/incb/en/annuaIJeporc2002.html (2002).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1990)
(citing United States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir.
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outright contravention of the Ninth 154 and Tenth 155 Amendments. 156
As easily as courts have dispelled the Commerce Clause attacks, so too
have they handily dismissed arguments on these grounds. 157 For example, in United States v. Kuromiya, the court asserted that "[t]he fundamental problem with the . . . argument is that 'the Ninth
Amendment has not been interpreted as independently securing any
constitutional rights for purposes of making out a constitutional violation'" and "as there is no constitutional provision by which one can
discern a fundamental right to possess, use, grow, or sell marijuana, it
is equally untenable to claim that there is a Ninth Amendment right
violated by its criminalization."158 Further, the Kuromiya court stated
that "so long as the passage of a federal criminal statute is a valid exercise of congressional commerce power, no violation of the Tenth
Amendment occurs."159
C.

State/Local and Federal Law in Conflict

1.

Impermissible Interference

Having definitively concluded that the CSA reflects the proper exercise by Congress of an enumerated constitutional power - commerce
power l60 - we next turn to an examination of whether state and local
laws permitting personal use of marijuana for alleged therapeutic purposes are an impermissible interference, by whatever definition or

154.
155.
156.
157.

158.

159.

160.

1972) (holding that Congress may constitutionally regulate intrastate drug
activity due to its effects on interstate commerce)).
U.S. CONST. amend. IX. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." [d.
U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." [d.
See, e.g., United States v. Kuromiya, 37 F. Supp. 2d 717, 725 (holding that
the CSA is constitutional in light of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments).
[d. See also San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked Ninth Amendment standing to challenge the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994).
Kuromiya, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 725 (quoting Reno, 98 F.3d at 1125) (discussing
constitutionality of the CSA)). See also The Findings and Recommendations for
Stubblefzeld v. Ashcroft, No. 03-6004-TC at 11, available at https:/ /ecf.ord.uscourts.gov/ (D. Or. filed Mar. 24, 2003).
37 F. Supp. 2d at 725. Other Constitutional provisions have also been used,
without success, as a basis for contesting the CSA's legality. Specifically,
"[t]he CSA has been attacked on various constitutional grounds, including
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Commerce Clause, the First,
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, as well as Equal Protection and Due Process." Blaine, supra note 28, at 1210. See also Stubblefield, Civ. No. 03-6004TC at 10-12 available at https://ecf.ord.uscourts.gov/ (D. Or. Mar. 24,
2003) (holding that the CSA violates neither the Ninth or Tenth Amendments, nor the Due Process Clause).
Kuromiya, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
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classification, with the CSA. The conclusion seems too easy. The application of such state and local laws of necessity - constituting a regime - not only implicate federal law, but contravene it as well. The
law is well settled, being that "[t]he Supreme Court has [sic] stated
that a federal statute may pre-empt state law ... where either (a) compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or (b) a state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."161
The Supreme Court, albeit in the context of alien registration, had
occasion to consider whether a state statute could stand in the face of
a federal law, the latter having been enacted to make a "harmonious
whole" of the alien registration regime, and passed pursuant to the
national government's "full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties."162 The Court asserted that
the test to be applied was whether the state "law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."163 The Court concluded that the state alien registration statute could not be enforced and that the ruling of the court
below, which had enjoined application of the state law, would be
affirmed. 164
In Straight Creek Bus v. Saylor,165 a bus company, Bell Coach Lines,
doing business in Kentucky during World War II could not commence
operations without first securing both a "certificate of war necessity"
from the Federal Office of Defense Transportation (ODT) and a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Kentucky Division of
Motor Transportation (DMT) .166 If operations were not begun within
sixty days after receiving the state certificate, however, the governing
statute provided that the certificate "shall become null and void."167 A
competitor of Bell's [the appellant], who wanted to provide services
over the same bus routes at stake, brought the matter to the attention
of the DMT director that Bell had not begun operating after the requisite sixty days, and thus sought a determination that Bell's certificate
be nullified as provided by state law. 168
Bell protested, claiming that it had been advised by "Federal authorities charged with the responsibility of issuing gasoline and approving
public transportation operations" not to start operations until further
notice. 169 Bell had heeded this advice, as it did not want to jeopardize
its future chances to secure rationed gas, tires, etc. if it actually began
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

16A AM. JUR. 2n Constitutional Law § 243 (1998).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63, 73 (1941).
Id. at 67.
Id. at 74.
185 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945).
Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 254.
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bus service. 170 Bell, therefore, simply waited and did nothing. 171
Thus, Bell was presented with a classic Hobson's choice, because if it
had begun service pursuant to the Kentucky certificate, the carrier
would be contravening the caution that it wait. 172 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky found no conflict, because securing a Certificate of
War Necessity from the federal government "cannot plausibly be said
. . . [to] suspend [] a state statute which commands nothing to the
contrary, but merely withdraws a privilege .... "173 In the course of
reaching this conclusion, and importantly for our purposes, the justices also remarked that "since the federal Constitution is the supreme
law of the land, a federal enactment authorized by that instrument
prevails over a state statute and suspends the operation of the latter
when its enforcement would necessitate or sanction the performance
of an act prohibited by the former."174
This is precisely the issue with which we are confronted: State and
local "medical" marijuana initiatives sanction conduct that the CSA
prohibits and because of the supremacy clause, they cannot stand in
the face of federal law to the contrary.175 For example, one recent law
review Note reached the same conclusion, stating, "the California
Compassionate Use Act 176 and the federal CSA are in direct conflict. . . . The CSA does not exempt the distribution of marijuana to
seriously ill persons for their personal medical use . . . . Therefore,
based on the Supremacy Clause, the CSA preempts any contrary state
law."177
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added). Straight Creek Bus was cited with approval not too
long ago, in the Opinions of the Attorney General of Kentucky. 95-33 Op.
Atty. Gen. Ky. 2-126 to 2-127 (1995). "[I]f the laws or public policy of the
states comes into conflict with the federal statutes ... the state law must
yield. The prohibition of a federal statute may not be set at naught ... by
state statutes ... and the extent and nature of the legal consequences of an
act which is made unlawful by federal law are determined by that law, conflicting state policy or law notwithstanding." 81A Cj.S. States § 24 (1977).
175. SeeGonzalesv. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,2212 (2005).
176. CAL. HEALTH & SAFE"IY CODE § ll362.5 (West Supp. 2005).
177. Blaine, supra note 28, at 1218-19. Note that the case Blaine is discussing,
United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, confusingly seems to speak out of
both sides of the mouth while discussing the ramifications of the California
Compassionate Use Act. 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, llOO (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd,
532 U.S. 483 (2001) (The Compassionate Use Act was added by initiative
measure, Proposition 215, § 1, approved November 1996). On the one
hand, the court says that the "[dJefendants are correct that Proposition 215
does not conflict with federal law . .. because on its face it does not purport
to make legal any conduct prohibited by federal law; it merely exempts
certain conduct by certain persons from the California drug laws." Id. at
1100 (emphasis added); cf Marijuana Policy Project v. D.C. Bd. of Elections
and Ethics, 191 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206-07 (D.D.C. 2002), rev'd, 46 Fed. Appx.
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Mere Enactment of State Medical Use Statute vs. Affirmative Conduct Consistent with State Statute

An argument can be made that medical use statutes, in and of
themselves, depending upon how they are drafted, do not pose a conflict with the CSA. 178 A conflict comes into being, so the argument
goes, only when a person affirmatively acts or does what the medical
use statute permits, thus not running afoul of the state or local law,
633, 2002 WL 31098318 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Yet with its next breath, the California federal court also says that
[n]otwithstanding the operative language of Proposition 215, its
declared purpose ... suggests that California's voters want to exempt medical marijuana from prosecution under federal, as well as
state law, even if that is not what they enacted. A state law which
purpmts to legalize the distribution of marijuana for any purpose,
however, even a laudable one, nonetheless directly conflicts with
federal law, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (emphasis added). The
court's second interpretation is in line with Straight Creek Bus, 185 S.W.2d at
254 and M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,425-26. See also
BOGOMOLNY, supra note 43, at 143; stating:
There is no question that a state can remove all criminal sanctions for drug sale or possession without coming into conflict with
the federal law. The problem will corne when a state attempts to deregulate
a given drug and permits its sale contrary to the federal law. More likely
than not, this will be deemed a positive conflict and the state law will fall.
Thus, in the regulatory area, states are left with the option of not
legislating at all or legislating in a manner which conforms with
federal law. (Emphasis added).
Note that in Cannabis Cultivators Club, the district court issued a preliminary injunction pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 882(a) preventing various cannabis clubs, also including the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative
(OCBC), from distributing marijuana to patients claiming a medical need.
5 F. Supp. 2d at 1l04, 1l06. Section 882(a) authorizes "enjoin[ing] violations" of the CSA. See 21 U.S.C. § 882(a) (1999). Among other things,
OCBC then moved the district court to modify the injunction to permit the
distribution of cannabis to patients with a doctor's certificate, indicating
that marijuana was a "medical necessity" for the patient. United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam). The district court denied the motion believing that such equitable powers as it possessed were insufficient to override the CSA. Id. The
Ninth Circuit did not vacate the injunction, but remanded with instructions
"to reconsider [OCBC's] request for a modification that would exempt
from the injunction distribution to seriously ill individuals who need cannabis for medical purposes." Id. at 1115. The district court proceeded as
urged, modifying its preliminary injunction to accommodate medical necessity, whereupon the United States successfully petitioned for certiorari.
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., No. C98-0088, 2000 WL
1517166 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2000). The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that medical necessity is not an exception to the CSA's prohibition against
the "manufacture and distribution" of marijuana. United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001).
178. See, e.g., Blaine, supra note 28, at 1218-19 (stating the CSA only dominates
state statutes when the language used prevents both statutes from coexisting).
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but violating only the CSA. 179 As an example, California Proposition
215 in part and by its terms offers marijuana possessors, patients, and
primary caregivers absolution from California drug laws I80 that would,
in the absence of Proposition 215, otherwise criminalize their
conduct. I8I
Assuming it to be the case that there is no "actual" conflict between
statutes like Proposition 215 and the CSA until one affirmatively performs an act in conformance with the state law which, at one and the
same time, nevertheless constitutes a CSA violation, where does that
leave us? Let us submit that the difference is one without a meaningful distinction because the federal government can always successfully
prosecute the CSA violator regardless of whether the moment of conflict arises at the time the state statute is enacted or at the time the
subject possesses or "cultivate [s]" marijuana. 182 Put differently, a CSA
violation stands alone, and it is irrelevant whether the conduct that it
prohibits is consistent with or also in conflict with Proposition 215. 183
The only reason that we can fathom why it might matter whether
laws like Proposition 215 are, at their moment of enactment, in conflict with the CSA is that one could argue that such statutes are void ab
initio. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had occasion to consider
the viability of a conviction for violation of a state sedition law in the
face of the defendant's argument that it was preempted by the federal
sedition statute, the Smith Act, addressing the same subject matter. I84
The defendant argued that enactment of the federal law automatically
suspended operation of its Pennsylvania counterpart. I85 The Pennsylvania court agreed, quashed the state indictment, and in the course
of its analysis looked at the disparate sentencing schemes in the two
statutes, the state statute being much harsher. 186 Using language applicable a fortiori to the CSA-Proposition 215 schism, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court said,
179. Id. at 1219.
180. "Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358,
relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a
patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the
personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician." CAL. HEALTH & SAFElY CODE
§ 11362.5(d) (West 2005).
181. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFElY CODE §§ 11257-58 (West 1991).
182. See 21 U.S.c. § 844(a), (c) (1999). See also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct.
2195,2212 (2005) ("[TJhe CSA would still impose controls required by California law.").
183. U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1100 (N.D.
Cal. 1998).
184. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 104 A.2d 133, 136 n.2, 139 (Pa. 1954), affd,350
U.S. 497 (1956). At the time of this ruling, the Smith Act was codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2384-85 (1948).
185. Nelson, 104 A.2d at 137 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 136, 139.
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[s]uch a disparity [20 yrs. v. 6-10 yrs. for a Smith Act violation] in the sentences prescribed for the same offense, if
multiplied by further like instances from other States, could
not help but confuse and hinder the attack on sedition
which calls for uniform action on a national basis. U niformity in the range of sentences imposable throughout the country for sedition against the Government of the United States
is assured only by the exclusive use of the federal statute. 187

D.

Enjoining the Operation of State Statutes

There is precedent for the proposition that the federal government
can successfully institute a suit against a state whose laws permit what
federal enactment and the Constitution prohibit. In United States v.
Mississippi 188 the Attorney General filed a complaint against the state
of Mississippi, three members of the state's Board of Election Commissioners, and six county Registrars of Voters seeking, in part, an order
to restrain the continued enforcement of Mississippi state constitutional provisions and laws that had the cumulative effect of "hampering and destroying the right of Negro citizens of Mississippi to vote,"
in contravention of both federal law, 42 U.S.c. § 1971 (a), Article I of
the United States Constitution, as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 189
The lower court dismissed the federal complaint,190 and the Supreme Court, completely unimpressed with Mississippi's arguments
187. Id. at 139. Although conceded supra that states have concurrent jurisdiction with the U.S. regarding controlled substances, this does nothing to
dissipate the strength of the argument that the country cannot have statutory schemes covering the same subject area which move in different if not
opposite directions.
188. 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
189. Id. at 130. 42 U.S.c. § 1971 (a) (1) (2000) presently provides that all U.S.
citizens "otherwise qualified by law to vote ... shall be entitled and allowed
to vote ... without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State ... to
the contrary notwithstanding."
Taken together the state laws imposed literacy standards upon voter
applicants that could be interpreted and applied totally at the discretion of
voting officials resulting in the registration of a large number of white applicants and very few blacks. Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 131-32. The consequent
voter registration figures were completely out ofline with the racial proportional representation or makeup in the population as a whole. See Frank
Hobbs and Nicole Stoops, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century at 93,
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf (Nov. 2002) (stating
the population of Mississippi was 43.5% black in 1950).
The Fifteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by ... any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude [and that] [t]he
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1, 2.
190. United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925, 958 (D.C. Miss. 1964).
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and the lower court's logic, reversed and remanded. 191 Contrary to
the state's position, the justices found that, 1) there was statutory language permitting the federal government's suit,192 2) the state of Mississippi could be, and was properly made, a defendant in the lawsuit in
accordance with the particular terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (C),193 and 3)
that Congress had the constitutional power pursuant to the Fifteenth
Amendment, and was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, to
properly make Mississippi a defendant. 194 With regard to the last
point, the Supreme Court said that neither the Eleventh Amendment
nor "any other provision of the Constitution prevents or has ever been
seriously supposed to prevent a State's being sued by the United
States."195 This is so, even in the absence of any Congressional enactment specifically authorizing or permitting such a suit. 196 In particular, "[t]he United States in the past has in many cases been allowed to
file suits in this and other courts against States, with or without specific
authorization from Congress."197
Perhaps an even more compelling case that would lend credence to
federal efforts to enjoin state "medical" marijuana laws, which the Mississippi Court cited, is United States v. California. 198 In an original jurisdiction cause of action, the federal government sued the state in the
Supreme Court claiming that California had improperly sold leases
permitting private companies to extract mineral deposits, as well as
petroleum and natural gas off its coast. 199 The United States claimed
that the surface below the nation's territorial sea belonged to the federal government and not to California. 20o The state countered, con191. MississiPPi, 380 U.S. at 144.
192. Id. at 138. "Section 1971 was passed by Congress under authority of the
Fifteenth Amendment to enforce the Amendment's guarantee, which protects against any discrimination by a State, its laws, its customs, or its officials in any way." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (2000».
193. Id. at 139-42. Section 1971(c) provides that racially discriminatory acts engaged in by State personnel "shall also be deemed that of the State and the
State may be joined as a party defendant." This language is quoted in Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 139.
194. Id. at 140. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State.
" U.S. CONST.
amend. XI (emphasis added).
195. Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 140.
196. Id.
197. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
198. 332 U.S. 19 (1947). The Supreme Court characterized the nature of the
federal government suit as a prayer "for a decree declaring the rights of the
United States in the area as against California and enjoining California and
all persons claiming under it from continuing to trespass upon the area in
violation of the rights of the United States." Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 22.
200. Id. At the time of suit, the territorial sea claimed by the United States extended "three nautical miles outward from the shore." Id. at 24 n.1.
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tending that the three mile "ocean belt" was within California's
original boundary when it was admitted as a state to the union. 201
In support of its case, California surfaced a number of intriguing
arguments, one being that the litigation was not properly before the
court inasmuch as it presented "no case or controversy in a legal
sense, but only a difference of opinion between federal and state officials."202 The Supreme Court quickly disposed of this argument, asserting that while the State's characterization was not necessarily
incorrect, the nature of the action was
far more than that. ... The difference involves the conflicting claims of federal and state officials as to which government, state or federal, has a superior right to take or
authorize the taking of vast quantities of oil and gas underneath that land. . . . Such concrete conflicts as these constitute a controversy in the classic legal sense, and are the very
kind of differences which can only be settled by agreement,
arbitration, force, or judicial action .... [There exist] conflicting claims of governmental powers to authorize [the seabed's] use. 203
California had argued, unsuccessfully, before the Supreme Court
that "the Attorney General has not been granted power either to file
or maintain [the suit] ."204 The Supreme Court concluded otherwise,
plainly stating that
Congress has given a very broad authority to the Attorney
General to institute and conduct litigation in order to establish and safeguard government rights and properties .... An
Act passed by Congress and signed by the President could, of
course, limit the power previously granted the Attorney General to prosecute claims for the Government.... But no Act
of Congress has amended the statutes which impose on the
Attorney General the authority and du~ to protect the Government's interests through the courts. 05
20l. Id. at 23.
202. Id. at 24. This position is similar to the claim that "medical" marijuana laws
are not truly in conflict with the CSA until such time as an individual commits an act consistent with the state law which will at the same moment
constitute a CSA violation. Also, like the California facts, the "medical" marijuana landscape is a conflict in government powers as to which sovereign
has overriding, supreme authority to regulate marijuana.
203. Id. at 24-25.
204. Id. at 26.
205. Id. at 27-28 (citing, in part, In reCooper, 143 U.S. 472, 502-03 (1892». In
discussing where and how Congress gave a "broad authority to the Attorney
General to institute and conduct litigation," the Supreme Court made reference to 5 U.S.C. §§ 291 and 309-neither of which exist in Title 5 today-and a number of earlier decisions of the Court, including United States
v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888). Id. at 27. In San Jacinto Tin Co.,
the Attorney General brought an action against San Jacinto and two other
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The justices soon turned to the merits of the case, but before doing
so, commented upon the roles or "hats worn" by the United States in
pursuing this cause of action against California. 206 One of these roles
appears to be closely akin to the reasoning underlying the federal government's motivation for attempting to enjoin or invalidate state
"medical" marijuana laws: protection of the nation's citizenry.207
Thus, one such guise assumed by the United States, is its assertion of
"the right and responsibility to exercise whatever power and dominion are necessary to protect this country against dangers to the security and tranquility of its people incident to the fact that the United
States is located immediately adjacent to the ocean."208
Important for a "medical" marijuana preemption argument is the
conclusion that although both the federal government and the states
have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction in the area, to the extent a
conflict exists, there can only be one supreme sovereign and that must
be the national government. 209 In California, the State contended that
it properly exercised aspects of its authority out to three miles from
the low tide mark.210 The Supreme Court swept this argument aside,
stating: "[ c] onceding that the state has been authorized to exercise
local police power functions in the part of the marginal belt within its

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

companies, alleging that land patents issued by the U.S. were improperly
procured by dint of a survey that had been fraudulently conducted. 125
U.S. 274-75. Consequently, the federal government prayed that the survey
and patent be "set aside, vacated, and annulled." Id. at 275. One of the
issues raised by the defendant was whether the Attorney General even had
the authority under statute or the Constitution to commence the action. Id.
at 274. The Supreme Court first looked to the predecessor, Revised Statutes § 346, of present day 28 U.S.c. § 501 (2000). Id. The present day
statute is similarly worded to its ancestor, providing that "[t]he Department
of Justice is an executive department of the United States at the seat of
Government." 28 U.S.C. § 501 (2000). Upon consideration of this legislation, the Court observed:
There is no very specific statement of the general duties of the Attorney General, but it is seen from the whole chapter referred to
that he has the authority, and it is made his duty, to supervise the
conduct of all suits brought by or against the United States .... If
the United States, in any particular case, has ajust cause for calling
upon the judiciary of the country, in any of its courts for relief ... the question of the appeal to the judicial tribunals of the
country must primarily be decided by the Attorney General of the
United States.
San jacinto Tin, 125 U.S. at 278-79. The current version of 28 U.S.c. § 518
derives from former 5 U.S.c. § 309. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(b) (2000) (Historical and Revision Notes). 28 U.S.C. § 518(b) states "[w]hen the Attorney
General considers it in the interests of the United States, he may personally
conduct and argue any case in a court of the United States in which the
United States is interested .... ").
California, 332 U.S. at 29.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
California, 332 U.S. at 29-30.
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declared boundaries, these do not detract from the federal government's paramount rights in and power over this area."211
Another relevant opinion was written by the Supreme Court in
Philko Aviation v. Shacket, which involved a conflict between two swindled purchasers of the same aircraft who were seeking to determine
title. 212 The Shackets paid full price, and took possession of, an aircraft in Illinois. 213 The seller, a con artist, promised to provide the
"paperwork" at a later date but never did. 214 He then tried to sell the
same airplane to Philko Aviation and provided the aircraft title documents to Philko at closing.215 Philko's financing bank "recorded the
title documents with the Federal Aviation Administration," (FAA)
whereupon the Shackets sought to quiet title by commencing a declaratory judgment action. 216 The Shackets won in the lower courts but
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 217
At issue were the procedures required to perfect title to the aircraft. 218 In the words of the Supreme Court, § 503(c) of the·Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 prohibited the transfer of aircraft titles "from
having validity against innocent third parties unless the transfer [had]
been evidenced by a written instrument, and the instrument [had]
been recorded with the Federal Aviation Administration."219 Philko
argued that because it, and not the Shackets, had recorded the sale
with the FAA, the airplane was theirs.220 The Shackets countered,
claiming that they acquired title under the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which stated that not only did title transfers not
have to be recorded, but they did not even require written evidence of
sale if payment was "made and received."221 Writing for the court,
Justice White construed § 503(c) to require both an "instrument" evidencing all aircraft transfers and the recordation of that document
with the FAA. 222 Thus, "because of these federal requirements, state
laws permitting undocumented or unrecorded transfers are pre211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 36.
462 U.S. 406, 407-08 (1983).
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 408.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id. (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44108 (2000» (citation omitted).
Id. at 408.
Id. at 408-09. See ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/2-201(c) (West 1993).
Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 409-10. Section 503(c) provides:
No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is provided
for ... shall be valid in respect of such aircraft ... against any person other than the [transferee], his heir or devisee, or any person
having actual notice thereof, until such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the Secretary of
Transportation.
Id. at 409 (quoting the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U .S.C. § 1403 (1958».
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empted, for there is a direct conflict between § 503(c) and such state
laws, and the federal law must prevail."223
The fact pattern seems strikingly similar to the CSA versus "medical" marijuana scenario: Illinois enacted a permissive aircraft transfer
regime, and compliance with the State commercial transaction procedures were inconsistent with the federal statutory mechanism for the
exact same transaction. 224 But much like the argument that mere existence of "medical" marijuana laws poses no conflict with the CSA unless, and until, a CSA-prohibited transaction actually occurs,225 if an
aircraft owner never transfers a plane in a manner permitted by state
law, i.e., absence of a memorializing document and failure to record
the transfer instrument with the FAA, the owner is never placed in the
position where his or her business transaction will of necessity be conducted in a manner incompatible with federal statutory
requirements. 226
Because the legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act evidenced
Congressional intent that there be both documentation of all aircraft
transfers and recordation of those documents,227
Congress must have intended to preempt any state law under
which a transfer without a recordable conveyance would be
valid against innocent transferees or lienholders who have
recorded .... Any other construction would defeat the primary congressional purpose for the enactment of § 503(c),
which was to create 'a central clearing house for recordation
of titles so that a person, wherever he may be, will know
where he can find ready access to the claims against, or liens,
or other legal interests in an aircraft. '228
In much the same way, the purpose of the CSA, which included
nationwide marijuana criminalization, was certainly not meant at the
same time to permit or encourage the growing, cultivation, distribution, and use of marijuana within the fifty states at their discretion. 229
Id. at 4lO.
See supra notes 211-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 410 (citing H.R. REp. No. 75-2254, at 9 (1938)
and H.R. REp. No. 75-2635, at 74 (1938) (Conf. Rep.».
228. Id. at 410-11 (quoting To Create A Civil Aeronautics Authority: Hearings on
H.R 9738 Before the H. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th
Congo 407 (1938) (testimony of Fred D. Fagg, Director of Air Commerce,
Department of Commerce).
229. The CSA's purpose, in pertinent part, was "designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United
States ... by providing for an overall balanced scheme of criminal penalties
for offenses involving drugs." H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 1 (1970), reprinted
in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 4566, 4567. In Campbell V. Hussey, it was argued that a
Georgia tobacco classification regime merely supplemented and did not conflict with federal standards. 368 U.S. 297 (1961). Yet, the Court held that

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
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That would definitely send mixed signals, a consequence that Congress could not have wished. The Supreme Court specifically held in
Philko "that state laws allowing undocumented or unrecorded transfers
of interests in aircraft to affect innocent third parties are preempted
by the federal Act."230 Similarly, the conclusion is inescapable that
state "medical" marijuana laws are preempted by the CSA. 231
Another case of interest, Jones v. Hath Packing Co., involved differing
state and federal food labeling laws. 232 Joseph Jones, the Director of
the Department of Weights and Measures in Riverside County, California, ordered bacon packaged by Rath, and flour packaged by three
different milling companies, "removed from sale" for failure to comply with California weight measuring and labeling laws. 233 The packaging companies responded by successfully suing in the Central
District of California seeking both an injunction against Jones, as well
as a declaration that the California provisions were preempted by federal standards. 234 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and so did the Supreme Court. 235
Importantly for our consideration, and after observing that "Congressional enactments that do not exclude all state legislation in the
same field nevertheless override state laws with which they conflict[,]"
the Court reiterated the key standard used to determine whether preemption exists in instances of overlapping jurisdiction. 236 The test, or
standard, is whether '" [the State's] law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.' "237 Of significance to the consideration of the divergence
between the CSA statutory purpose and the "medical" marijuana initiatives is the Court's additional remarks; specifically, that examination of the issue demands an understanding of how the two statutory

230.
231.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

"Congress, in legislating concerning the types of tobacco sold at auction,
pre-empted the field and left no room for any supplementary state regulation concerning those same types." Id. at 301. The Court asserted this because the purpose of the federal scheme was to establish a definite,
uniform, and official U.S. classification and inspection standard. Id. The
argument for preemption is, of course, even stronger when a state scheme
is inconsistent with a federal standard that is designed to deal "in a comprehensive fashion" with an issue by creating "an overall balanced scheme."
H.R. REp. No. 91-1444, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4567,
4570. "The bill revises the entire structure of criminal penalties involving
controlled drugs by providing a consistent method of treatment of all persons accused of violations." Id.
Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 412.
See., e.g., Philko Aviation, 462 U.S. at 410; United States v. California, 332
U.S. 19,36 (1947).
430 U.S. 519 (1977).
Id. at 522.
Id. at 523-24.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 525-26.
Id. at 526 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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schemes in fact interoperate (or do not), as opposed to how they may
appear and be read in print. 238 In particular, "[t]his inquiry requires
us to consider the relationship between state and federal laws as they
are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written. "239
Mter first concluding that the federal standards preempted the California labeling regime with respect to bacon packaging, the Supreme
Court turned its attention to the federal and state approaches regarding the marking of flour packaging.240 The Court determined that the
applicable "federal weight-labeling standard for flour [was] the same
as it [was] for meat."241 Next, the justices observed that "it would be
possible to comply with the state law without triggering federal enforcement action, [the court] conclude[d] that the state requirement
[was] not inconsistent with federallaw[,]" and therefore, the federal
statute did not pre-empt California's.242 This strongly suggests that if
it were not possible to comply with state law absent the "triggering of
federal enforcement action," there would be inconsistency to the
point that preemption would result. 243
That lack of inconsistency between the federal and state labeling
requirements with respect to flour did not end matters for the Court,
which went on to determine that a significant purpose of the federal
statute was to "facilitate value comparisons among similar products,"
something not possible if the companies followed the California statutory scheme. 244 Adhering to state law in this instance "would prevent
'the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress . . . . [,]'" an "impermissible" result requiring that
"the state law must yield to the federal."245 The two sovereignties can238. Id.
239. Id. (emphasis added). The Court's adjuration is particularly relevant in
view of the argument that the CSA and "medical" marijuana initiatives do
not evidence conflict unless, and until, someone affirmatively engages in an
act which, although permitted by a State "medical" marijuana provision, is
at the same time a violation of the CSA. See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2001); See also
supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. Conversely, it is claimed, absent
such an act the two statutory schemes are not in "conflict." See 21 U.S.C.
§ 903 (2001); See also supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
Admittedly, the facts before the Supreme Court in Jones established
that the federal statute relating to bacon packaging prohibited labeling
"'requirements in addition to, or different than, those made under'" the
act. 430 U.S. at 530 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2000)). The Court concluded that this was an "explicit pre-emption provision dictat[ing] the result in the [bacon labeling] controversy between Jones and Rath." [d. at
530-31.
240. Jones, 430 U.S. at 532.
241. Id. at 533.
242. Id. at 540.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 541.
245. Id. at 543 (quoting, in part, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
See also Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982)
(federal regulations held to preempt state statute on same subject).
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not operate in their own spheres while at the same time exercising
their authority in conformity with the other. 246
The same logic compels the conclusion that adherence to state
"medical" marijuana laws "would prevent 'the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress'" as set forth
in the CSA,247 and that an action seeking a declaration that the CSA
preempts such state laws would properly lie. 248
To reiterate, a state law is preempted by a federal statute or regulation properly promulgated thereto, to the extent that the two conflict. 249 A conflict exists either when compliance with both the state
and federal law is impossible 250 or when the state law frustrates Congressional intent, i.e., the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."251 For our purposes, the CSA prohibits planting, cultivating, growing, harvesting, possessing, and distributing marijuana,252
which, of necessity, is in "conflict" with state laws permitting such
conduct. 253

246.

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

252.
253.

Even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it
actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when
'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility, or when state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.'
Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 153 (citation omitted). This is so even if the matter is
one that a state, for example, California, in addition to the federal government, is seeking to regulate or control is a subject of particular importance
or concern to the state and its people. See id. "The relative importance to
the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid
federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal
law must prevail." [d. (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962».
See also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm., 461 U.S. 190,216 n.28 (1983) ("[Sltate law may not frustrate the
operation of federal law simply because the state legislature in passing its
law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration.") (citing Perezv. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971»). See also Fla. Lime & Avocado
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give
way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the
federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar
or different objectives." (citing H.R. REp. No. 74-1241, at 22-23 (1935) and
S. REp. No. 74-1011, at 15 (1935»).
jones,430 U.S. at 543 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,79 (1990) (citing Fla. Lime, 373 U.S.
at 142-43).
[d. at 79.
[d.
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 141 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at
67).
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(15), (22), 841 (a)(l), 844 (2000).
See English, 496 U.S. at 79.
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CONCLUSION

The federal government is well-poised to argue in any forum that,
1) the CSA trumps state laws which provide immunity from state civil
and criminal prosecution to "medical" marijuana users and providers
and, 2) that the federal government can enforce the CSA against state
and local officials acting under a state/local "medical" marijuana law.

